The Carr Lake Project: Potential Biophysical Benefits of Conversion to a Multiple-Use Park

The Carr Lake Project aims to convert Carr Lake’s 450 acres of agriculture fields into a regional multi-use park that will benefit flood protection, water quality, and wildlife habitat, while also providing additional recreational areas for the local community. The Project is represented by an informal consortium of interested parties including the Watershed Institute of California State University Monterey Bay, The City of Salinas, 1000 Friends of Carr Lake, and the Big Sur Land Trust. (Document contains 54 pages

Contractual Intermediaries

This paper analyzes the role of third party intermediaries, such as courts and arbitrators, in contract enforcement. In our model, intermediaries compel contracted transfers and resolve disputes when requested to do so by the contracting agents. When the verifiability of information is limited, successful enforcement requires that dispute resolution costs be sufficiently great. Optimal enforcement systems economize on dispute resolution and information costs, and may involve establishment of specific systems tailored to particular groups. We show further that the "holdup problem" may be resolved via an appropriately designed dispute resolution system.

Entrepreneurship in International Trade

Motivated by evidence on the importance of incomplete information and networks in international trade, we investigate the supply of 'network intermediation.' We hypothesize that the agents who become international trade intermediaries first accumulate networks of foreign contacts while working as employees in production or sales, then become entrepreneurs who sell access to and use of the networks they accumulated. We report supportive results regarding this hypothesis from a pilot survey of international trade intermediaries. We then build a simple general-equilibrium model of this type of entrepreneurship, and use it for comparative statics and welfare analysis. One welfare conclusion is that intermediaries may have inadequate incentives to maintain or expand their networks, suggesting a rationale for the policies followed by some countries to encourage large-scale trading companies that imitate the Japanese sogo shosha.

Starting Small in an Unfamiliar Environment

Motivated by a characteristic way in which firms in developed countries make their decisions regarding cooperation with potential partners from less developed countries, we design a simple model of a DC firm's search for an LDC partner/supplier and the subsequent relationship between the two parties. Matched firms can "start small" with a trial order or pilot project of variable size in order to gain information about the ability of the LDC firm to successfully carry out a large project. We derive results relating whether and how the parties start small to the characteristics of the large project and to the matching environment. Among other results, we show how risk and search cost are associated with the propensity to start small and we establish a connection between starting small and the expected longevity of successful partnerships. We also address methods of contract enforcement and demonstrate the relationship between starting small and monitoring.

Preparing Tomorrow\u27s Classroom Leaders: Challenges for Christian Higher Education

Christian college teacher education program faculties face the challenge of employing a Christian epistemology that includes a pedagogy that embraces today’s learners. The authors seek to communicate the foundations of modernism and postmodernism and their impact on the epistemology and pedagogies employed in university classrooms. How the postmodern thinking claims have influenced the lives of Christian students will also be examined. The paper concludes with a discussion of the challenges for Christian teacher education faculties

Carmel River Lagoon Enhancement Project: Water Quality and Aquatic Wildlife Monitoring, 2005-6

In summer and fall 2004, the California Department of Parks and Recreation (DPR) initiated the Carmel River Lagoon Enhancement Project. The project involved excavation of a dry remnant Arm of the lagoon and adjacent disused farmland to form a significant new lagoon volume. The intention was to provide habitat, in particular, for two Federally threatened species: the California Red-Legged Frog, and the Steelhead Trout (South Central-Coastal California Evolutionary Significant Unit). DPR contracted with the Foundation of California State University Monterey Bay (Central Coast Watershed Studies Team, Watershed Institute) to monitor water quality and aquatic invertebrates in association with the enhancement, and to attempt to monitor steelhead using novel video techniques. The monitoring objective was to assess whether the enhancement was successful in providing habitat with good water quality, adequate invertebrate food for steelhead, and ultimately the presence of steelhead. (Document contains 102 pages

Carmel River Lagoon Enhancement Project: Water Quality and Aquatic Wildlife Monitoring, 2006-7

This is a report to the California Department of Parks and Recreation. It describes water quality and aquatic invertebrate monitoring after the construction of the Carmel River Lagoon Enhancement Project. Included are data that have been collected for two years and preliminary assessment of the enhanced ecosystem. This report marks the completion of 3-years of monitoring water quality and aquatic habitat. The report adopts the same format and certain background text from previous years’ reporting by the same research group (e.g. Larson et al., 2005). (Document contains 100 pages

Starting Small and Commitment

I study a model of a long-term partnership with two-sided incomplete information. The partners jointly determine the stakes of their relationship and individually decide whether to cooperate with or betray each other over time. I characterize the extremal -- interim incentive efficient equilibria. In these equilibria, the partners generally "start small," with the level of interaction growing over time. The types of players separate quickly. Further, cooperation between "good" types is viable regardless of how pessimistic the players are about each other initially. The quick nature of separation in an extremal equilibrium contrasts with the outcome selected by a strong renegotiation criterion (as studied in Watson [11]).

Contract-Theoretic Approaches to Wages and Displacement

This paper develops a theoretical framework for analyzing contracting imperfections in long-term employment relationships. We focus chiefly on limited enforceability and limited worker liquidity. Inefficient severance of employment relationships, payment of efficiency wages, the relative responses of wages and employment to business cycle shocks, and the propagation of these shocks are linked to the nature of contracting imperfections.